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A THEORY OF REFERENCE-DEPENDENT BEHAVIOR
JOSE APESTEGUIAy AND MIGUEL A. BALLESTERz
Abstract. Extensive eld and experimental evidence in a variety of environments
show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic
characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more struc-
ture on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly
higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of in-
consistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the
phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work:
one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.
Keywords: Individual rationality, reference-dependence, rationalization, path in-
dependence, status-quo bias, addiction, habit formation.
JEL classication numbers: A12, B41, D11.
1. Introduction
Extensive evidence has accumulated over the last few decades to suggest that be-
havior in a variety of settings is in part determined by a reference point. The ref-
erence point may be interpreted as the default choice, as in the status quo bias or
endowment eect literature; the aspiration level, as in aspiration adaptation mod-
els; the convention, norm, or belief about what one should choose, as, for example,
in cognitive dissonance studies; past consumption, as in addiction, habit formation,
status-seeking, or brand loyalty models; and others.
This paper provides a conceptual framework for the systematic study of reference-
dependent behavior. The approach we follow is axiomatic and gradual. We study
the properties of reference-dependent choice correspondences and reference-dependent
preferences that impose gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and
preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing
the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of
behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. We focus
on those cases where the reference point, if it exists, is itself an element of the choice
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set. The reference point, moreover, changes with each choice, in the sense that the
last choice is the new reference point.
The gradual incorporation of behavioral structure described in this paper involves
four steps. In the rst, we study the properties that are needed to rationalize
reference-dependent choice correspondences. That is, we explore the conditions that
a choice correspondence needs to satisfy in order to be explained by a book of prefer-
ence relations.
1 We argue that this consistency requirement is a minimal rationality
condition to be imposed on a formal treatment of reference-dependent behavior. By
extending properties , , and the weak axiom of revealed preference to choice prob-
lems with reference points, we obtain that a choice correspondence satises properties
 and , if and only if, it satises the weak axiom, if and only if, there exists a book
of complete preorder relations that rationalizes the choice correspondence. Interest-
ingly, we show that this book may be incomplete (and even intransitive) in the space
of alternatives lying \below" the reference point. Further, we show that the book is
unique in the behaviorally relevant space, that is in all those pairs that are \above"
the reference point.
We then study non-dominated behavior. By non-dominated behavior we mean
situations where there are no cycles. For example, let an agent be confronted with
a choice problem involving two alternatives, x and y, and let us assume that when
she chooses from reference point x she strictly prefers y and vice versa. If the last
choice determines the next reference point, the agent will repeatedly switch back
and forth between x and y. Clearly, such erratic behavior is not consistent even
with minimal rationality requirements. We identify the axioms on preferences and on
choice correspondences that guarantee non-dominated behavior.
Furthermore, we say that behavior is independent of the initial reference point if,
given a choice set, nal choices (to be formally dened below) cannot be inuenced
by the initial choice of reference point. Our next result characterizes the typology
of choice correspondences and books of preferences that satisfy independence of the
initial reference point.
Finally, a natural step further in the study of the rationality of reference-dependent
behavior is the analysis of when behavior is not only independent of the initial refer-
ence point in a given choice set, but also independent of the way in which the choice
problem is presented. That is, we will say that behavior is path-independent whenever
nal choices do not depend on the sequence in which choice problems are presented.
After imposing all this structure, the immediate question that arises is whether
behavior is still reference-dependent, or collapses instead into a unique order, as in
the classical setup. We will show by means of an example that there is still room for
reference-point dependence.
It is immediate that the classic behavioral case, where there is a unique complete
preorder rationalizing a single choice correspondence satisfying the classic version of
the weak axiom of revealed preference, is free from all these inconsistencies. That
1Books of preference relations will be precisely dened below. For now, consider a book of
preference relations as a collection of preference relations, one for each of the elements in the universal
set of alternatives, and one that represents the preferences when there is no reference point.3
is, it shows non-dominated behavior that is independent of starting conditions and
also path-independent. Our analysis, then, evaluates the degree of rationality of
reference-dependent behavior against the classic case. This seems to us to be a
natural starting point for a deep theoretical understanding of reference dependent
behavior. Furthermore, our framework suggests a measure of the degree of rationality
of reference-dependent behavior. It may be argued that the severity of a particular
reference-dependent phenomenon may be estimated from the place it takes in the
gradual structure we propose.
We end the paper by applying the framework derived here to two empirically well-
established; status quo bias and addiction. We show that, although the character-
izations dier in each case, choice behavior, be it subject to the status quo bias or
to addiction, can be rationalized by a book of complete preorders that satises non-
dominated behavior, without necessarily being independent of initial reference points
or path-independent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of related literature.
Section 3 introduces the notation that will be used subsequently. Section 4 contains
the analysis of the four structural steps that may be imposed to reference-dependent
behavior. In section 5 we develop two applications. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
All the proofs are given in section 7.
2. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) were the rst to
provide an explicit model of reference-dependent preferences. Their model is an
extension of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory to riskless choices,
designed to model the status quo bias and related issues. They work with a book of
reference-dependent preferences on a two-dimensional commodity space, and assume,
instead of axiomatically deriving, certain types of behavior (such as loss aversion)
that lead to the status quo bias.
Munro and Sugden (2003) revise and extend Tversky and Kahneman's (1991) model
to the n-dimensional commodity space. Sagi (2006), Sugden (2003), Giraud (2004),
and K oszegi and Rabin (2006) constitute further developments. Sagi (2006) studies
the structure of the book of preference relations at the light of imposing a \no-regret"
consistency property (see section 4.2 below for an elaboration on this property), both
in riskless and risky settings. Sugden proposes a generalization of Savage's expected
utility theory to the case where preferences are reference-dependent. Giraud deals,
among other things, with the elusive question of the welfare evaluation of reference-
dependent behavior. These three papers have in common that they are axiomatic, and
that they study the relationship between dierent reference-dependent preferences.
Finally, K oszegi and Rabin study the case where the reference point is determined by
decision-maker outcome expectations.2
One strand of the literature follows the revealed preference approach pioneered
by Zhou (1997). Zhou provides an axiomatic foundation for the status quo bias for
2See also the work of Bleichrodt (2006, 2007) and Giraud (2006, 2007).4
choice functions. His approach has been followed by Bossert and Sprumont (2006),
and by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Bossert and Sprumont consider status quo choice
correspondences that select all those alternatives that are at least as good as the
status quo. The closest paper to ours is Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). They provide
a powerful characterization of the status quo bias. In section 5.1, we derive, on
the preferences side, the properties that are equivalent to theirs. Furthermore, their
framework includes the study of choice problems with and without reference points,
which is the view we adopt here.3
The contributions of our analysis to the literature are two-fold. First, we ax-
iomatically study reference-dependent behavior from the perspective of both choice
correspondences and preferences. Second, we provide a general axiomatic baseline in
a riskless setting that starts by imposing minimal rationality assumptions, and then
gradually incorporates more structure into reference-dependent behavior, thus freeing
the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies.
3. Notation
Let X be an arbitrary nonempty set of elements, representing the space of alter-
natives, and X the set of all nonempty subsets of X. For notational convenience,
and following Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), we use  to denote an element such that
 = 2 X. It will be convenient to dene X = X [ fg. A choice problem is a pair
(T;s), where T 2 X, and either s 2 T or s = . When s 2 T we say that (T;s) is a
choice problem that depends on a reference point, and when s =  we say that (T;s)
is a choice problem that does not depend on a reference point. C(X) represents the
set of all possible choice problems (T;s), while Crd(X) denotes the set of all possible
choice problems with a reference point.
A choice correspondence c(T;s) assigns for every (T;s) a subset of T in X. Hence,
c : C(X) ! X, where c(T;s)  T for all (T;s) 2 C(X). Note that, as usual, c is by
denition a non-empty valued mapping.
We now introduce reference-dependent preference relations. For every s 2 X
denote by s a binary relation on X, s X  X. We denote by fsgs2X the
collection of all such binary relations. We refer to this collection as the book of
reference-dependent binary relations associated to X.
Binary relations s and s are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of s, respec-
tively. Hence, x s y if, and only if, x s y and :(y s x), and x s y if, and
only if, x s y and y s x. We will say that a binary relation is a preorder if it is
reexive and transitive, and a partial order if it is an antisymmetric preorder. For any
(T;s), M(T;s) denotes the set of maximal elements in T with respect to s, that is,
M(T;s) = fx 2 T : y s x for no y 2 Tg, and G(T;s) denotes the set of greatest
elements in T with respect to s; G(T;s) = fx 2 T : x s y for every y 2 Tg.
Finally, the restriction of a reference-dependent preference relation s to any subset
3Masatlioglu and Ok (2006) and Masatlioglu and Uler (2006) constitute recent developments in
the revealed preference approach.5
T  X is the relation sjT on T such that, for all x;y 2 T, x s y if and only if
x sjT y.
4. Reference-Dependent Behavior
In this section we introduce four steps that gradually incorporate more structure
into reference-dependent behavior. The \adequate" degree of behavioral structure
will be determined by the phenomenon that is to be studied.
In section 4.1 the problem of rationalization of reference-dependent behavior is
studied. There, rationality requirements are imposed given a reference point. How-
ever, the absence of any connection among the dierent orderings that conform an
individual book of preferences may be the origin of inconsistencies in individual be-
havior. In sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 we study this type of inconsistency using a very
simple model of nested reference points. We assume that the reference point corre-
sponds to the default option of the decision-maker and second, the last choice denes
the next reference point. That is, we do not initially presume complex rationality in
the behavior of our agent. She takes current decisions according to the preference
ordering related to her default option, without anticipating how this will inuence
future decisions. Of course we could alternatively assume that the decision-maker
anticipates how actual choices will determine subsequent reference points, and hence
future choices. However, in this paper we choose the above explained simple myopic
version as the starting point, and only obtain sophisticated reference-dependent be-
havior as the result of certain rationality principles we will impose (see sections 4.3
and 4.4 below).
Now consider the following denition.
Denition 4.1. Let (Ti;si)n
i=0 be a sequence of reference-dependent choice prob-
lems and let c be a choice correspondence. Then (Ti;si)n
i=0 is an RD-chain for c if
si 2 Ti, Ti = Tj = T for all 0  i;j  n and si 2 c(T;si 1) for all i = 1;2;:::;n.
An RD-chain is cyclical if s0 2 c(T;sn). An RD-chain is strict if there exists k in
f0;1;:::;n   1g such that sk 62 c(T;sk).
Note that the above denes RD-chains on the basis of a single, xed choice set T.
Three examples are introduced below. The rst gives an instance of strict and cyclical
RD-chains, the second, one of cyclical but non strict RD-chains, and the third, one
of strict and non cyclical RD-chains.
Example 4.2. Let X = fx;yg, fxg = c(X;y), fyg = c(X;x), and X = c(X;).
Example 4.3. Let X = fx;yg, fyg = c(X;y), fxg = c(X;x), and X = c(X;).
Example 4.4. Consider the set X = N where N is the set of natural numbers, and





where k > 2. Take a choice correspondence such that for any (T;s) 2 Crd(X), it is
c(T;s) = z where z is the greatest element in the set T \f(s). Finally, for any (T;),
let c(T;) = T.
The interpretation of examples 4.2 and 4.3 is straightforward. Note that in example
4.2, starting at (X;x), the agent goes to (X;y), and then back to (X;x). This clearly
constitutes a cyclical and strict RD-chain. In example 4.3, starting, e.g., from (X;x),
goes to (X;x), representing a cyclical non-strict RD-chain. The behavior described
in example 4.4 corresponds to an agent who, when endowed with a reference point
s 2 X maximizes the consumption of a \good" in a neighborhood of its reference
point s 2 N. For example, take T = X, s = 1 and k = 3. It is easy to see that from
(X;1), we move to (X;3), and then to (X;9), (X;27), and so on, which illustrates
the case of a non-cyclical and strict RD-chain.
Note that in Denition 4.1 it is stated that si 2 T, hence one may wonder about
RD-chains with si = . Note, however, that since c(T;)  T then si =  is only
possible when i = 0, but then, for our purposes, one can take the RD-chain following
s0 = .
4.1. Rationalization of Reference-Dependent Choice Correspondences. The
question of the rationalization of reference-dependent choice correspondences ad-
dresses the problem of the existence of a book of binary relations that is consistent
with choice behavior. Formally, a choice correspondence c on C(X) is M-rationalized
by a book of preorders fsgs2X if for any choice problem (T;s) 2 C(X), c(T;s) =
M(T;s). We will also be interested in a related rationalization notion, dened
on the grounds of greatest elements: a choice correspondence c on C(X) is G-
rationalized by a book of preorders fsgs2X if for any choice problem (T;s) 2 C(X),
c(T;s) = G(T;s). Clearly, if the book is composed of complete preorders, then both
notions coincide. Otherwise, note that G(T;s)  M(T;s).
In a classic article, Arrow (1959) showed that in the context of choice problems
without a reference point, Samuelson's weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP)
guarantees that there is a unique complete preorder relation  that rationalizes
c(;). Based on the version of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), we now
present a variant of the weak axiom within the context of choice problems with a
reference point.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP): For any (T;s) 2 C(X) with
x;y 2 T and x 2 c(T;s), then for any (V;s) 2 C(X) with x;y 2 V and y 2 c(V;s), it
must be that x 2 c(V;s).
It is well-known that, in the standard context, the weak axiom is equivalent to
Sen's (1969) properties  and . Consider the following adaptation of properties 
and , due to Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).7
Property : For any (T;s);(V;s) 2 C(X); if y 2 V  T and y 2 c(T;s); then
y 2 c(V;s).
Property : For any (T;s) 2 C(X), if z;y 2 c(T;s), T  V , and z 2 c(V;s), then
y 2 c(V;s).
As already informally mentioned in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), the versions of
properties  and  for reference-dependent contexts are equivalent to the version of
WARP introduced above. It turns out that properties  and  (and consequently
WARP) imply the existence of a book of preorders that rationalizes c. Furthermore,
we show that the existence of such a book of preorder relations implies that the choice
correspondence c satises those variants of properties  and .
The main dierence between our setting and the classic one lies in the fact that,
here, each choice correspondence c(;s) is not dened on the whole X, but only on
the lter Xs := fS 2 X : s 2 Sg. Xs has the feature of not containing all pairs of ob-
jects. In particular fx;yg = 2 Xs whenever x 6= s and y 6= s. As a consequence of this,
reference-dependent choice behavior is intimately connected to incomplete preference
orders.4 That is, when there is a reference point s 2 X, all that is required is to
impose completeness over the set of alternatives that is no worse than the reference
point s. No structure is needed \below" the reference point, since these elements are
never chosen. Hence the book of preference relations may be incomplete, in this very
specic way.5 The following result formalizes this discussion.
Lemma 4.5. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following three statements
are equivalent:
 c satises axiom WARP.
 c satises properties  and .
 There exists a book fsgs2X of preorders  -rationalizing (  2 fG;Mg) such
that for all s 2 X, s is complete on the set Xs := fx 2 X : x 2 c(fx;sg;s)g.
Moreover, if f1
sgs2X and f2
sgs2X are two books  -rationalizing c, then 1
sjUs=2
sjUs
for all s 2 X, where Us = fx 2 X : x s sg:
Lemma 4.5 shows that: (i) The book fsgs2X rationalizing c can be formed by
incomplete relations, but these must be complete for all elements above the reference
point; (ii) The kind of rationalization, G or M, is not fundamental, in the sense that
a book fsgs2X G-rationalizes c if, and only if, M-rationalizes c. We may therefore
speak simply of the rationalization of a choice correspondence c, forgoing the need
4Bleichrodt (2006, 2007) also deals with incomplete reference-dependent preferences in this sense.
5In fact, transitivity may also be relaxed accordingly. That is, transitivity is only required in
the space \above" the reference point and it should be the case that all the alternatives \below"
the reference point are strictly preferred by all the alternatives \above" the reference point. Then,
violations of transitivity involving elements below the reference point are admissible. For ease of
exposition, however, we assume throughout that the reference-dependent preferences are transitive.8
for the qualier   2 fG;Mg; (iii) The book of relations fsgs2X rationalizing c
is unique in the relevant behavioral part, that is in all those pairs lying above the
reference points. In particular, for a given book fsgs2X dening the relation  on
X by x  y , x y y, if f1
sgs2X and f2
sgs2X are two books rationalizing c, then
1=2.
Now, it is immediate that it is possible to complete the binary relations of the
book fsgs2X that rationalizes c to convert it into a complete preorder book. For
example, for every s whenever x;y 2 X n Xs write x s y. This is the completion
that is performed in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following three state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises axiom WARP.
 c satises properties  and .
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorders rationalizing c.
Moreover, if f1
sgs2X and f2
sgs2X are two books rationalizing c, then 1
s jUs =2
s
jUs for all s 2 X, where Us = fx 2 X : x s sg:
Lemma 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 establish the baseline for an axiomatic treatment of
reference-dependent behavior. In what follows and for ease of exposition, we will
refer to books of complete preorders rationalizing c. Note, however, that all that is
in fact needed is that the preorders s be complete in Xs only. We now turn to
the study of non-dominated behavior, independence of initial reference points, and
path-independence.
4.2. Non-dominated Behavior. Non-dominated behavior is often imposed as one
of the very rst rationality requirements. For its motivation, consider the following
\money-pump" argument. Take, in the context of the classical formulation: x  y 
x. Suppose the agent starts with option x. Since y  x, the agent could pay a small
enough sum to obtain y instead of x. After this trade, the agent could, by similar
reasoning return to x. The agent comes back to the original element, but with her
money endowment diminished, and would again be willing, for a small enough sum,
to trade x for y.6
The latter is a clear example of the possible irrationality of intransitive agents, who
can be manipulated into sequences of choices. The literature on reference-dependent
preferences has played close attention to this sort of questions. Munro and Sugden
(2002), Sugden (2003), Sagi (2006) and Giraud (2007) study the consequences of
dierent kinds of restrictions.
6There are however many discussions on the general validity of the money-pump argument (see
for example Raia 1968, Fishburn 1988, or Mandler 2005). In particular, it could be argued that,
for the money-pump argument to be valid, preferences should be dened over the Cartesian product
of money and alternatives. See Danan (2005) for a treatment in this direction.9
We start the analysis by considering a property proposed by Giraud (2007) that
applies to pairs of alternatives only.
Status Quo (SQ): For any x;y 2 X, x y y ) x x y.
Clearly, SQ directly eliminates the money-pump argument in the case of two alter-
natives. Interestingly, in the presence of rationalizability, it is not dicult to show
that SQ is equivalent to a property that plays an important role in the subsequent
analysis:
Weak-NSC: When the opportunity set has two elements, there is no RD-chain
associated to the choice correspondence c that is cyclical and strict at the same time.
The proof is straightforward. It suces to note that, according to Lemma 4.5,
x y y and y x x is equivalent to x 2 c(fx;yg;y) and y = c(fx;yg;x). Thus, a
violation of SQ is directly connected to a violation of Weak-NSC. The following result
is therefore obtained.
Theorem 4.7. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties ,  and Weak-NSC.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises SQ.
A natural extension of SQ to any number of alternatives is Weakly Exchange-
Aversion, which appears in Sugden (2003):
Weakly Exchange-Aversion (WEA): For any s0;s1;:::;sn 2 X such that
sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0, it must be sn sn s0.
The choice domain property can be extended similarly.
Non-Strict Cycles (NSC): There is no RD-chain associated to the choice corre-
spondence c that is cyclical and strict at the same time.
Note that the previous denition involves only choice problems with the same set
of available options. Houthakker (1950) already proposed a property, \semitransitiv-
ity", that restricts the relation between the rst and last elements of a chain. In his
version, however, the choice set may change from one link to the other. Our consider-
ation of a single set, then, enables us to establish a stronger result, in the context of
reference-dependent behavior. We next show that this is sucient to guarantee that
the book of complete preorders fsgs2X that rationalizes c satises WEA. However,
although the extension of the result seems natural, the proof of the equivalence is not10
straightforward.
Theorem 4.8. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties ,  and NSC.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises WEA.
Note that WEA has bite only in the relevant part of a book, namely, above the
reference points. Thus, every book rationalizing c when ,  and NSC hold, also
satises WEA.
Other properties in the literature deal with stronger notions. It is immediate that
Sugden's Strictly Exchange-Aversion (SEA),7 or Sagi's No-regret (NR),
8 imply WEA
and SQ. Therefore, the following corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.8.
Corollary 4.9. If there exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorders that rationalizes
c and satises SEA or NR, then c satises properties ,  and NSC.
4.3. Independence of the Initial Reference Point. We will say that behavior is
independent of the initial reference point if, for any given T in X, \nal" choices do
not depend on an initial reference point. Consider example 4.3 above. There, the
decision-maker exhibits rationalizable and non-dominated behavior but, when con-
fronted with choice problem (X;x) selects x, and when presented with choice problem
(X;y) chooses y. That is, given the choice set, her choice depends on whichever ref-
erence point prevails.9
Clearly, independence from the initial reference point imposes a great deal of consis-
tency between the preference orders of dierent reference points. This leads naturally
to the following question: Is it possible that reference-dependent behavior that is
rationalizable, non-dominated, and independent of the initial reference point may
still depend on reference points, or does it instead collapse into a unique order as in
the classical setup? We will see that behavior may in fact still depend on reference
points. This shows that behavior exhibiting a great deal of rationality may still show
reference point dependency.
The following denition states precisely what we mean by \nal" choices.
Denition 4.10. Set L, L 6= ;, is the limit set of problem (T;s0) 2 C(X) if the
following two properties are satised:
7SEA: For any s0;s1;:::;sn 2 X such that sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0, sn sn s0.
Munro and Sudgen's (2002) Weak Acyclicity is equivalent to WEA.
8NR: For any x;y 2 X, x y (y)y ) x s (s)y for all s 2 X.
9It is interesting to note that given that the behavior of a subject is initial reference point
dependent, she can be manipulated in such a way as to increase her well-being (see footnote 14).11
 For any RD-chain (T;si)n
i=0 containing a cyclical chain (T;si)n
i=j, j 2 f0;1;:::;ng,
it is fsj;sj+1;:::;sng  L.
 For any z 2 L, there exists an RD-chain (T;si)n
i=0 containing a cyclical chain
(T;si)n
i=j and z 2 fsj;sj+1;:::;sng.
The limit set of (T;s0) comprises all the elements that are part of at least one
cyclical RD-chain that may arise in an RD-chain starting at (T;s0). Then, for every
choice problem (T;s0) if a limit set exists, it is always unique. Consider the following
example.
Example 4.11. Let X = fx;y;zg, c(X;x) = c(X;y) = c(fx;yg;x) = c(fx;yg;y) =
fx;yg, c(X;z) = c(fy;zg;y) = c(fy;zg;z) = fyg, c(fx;zg;x) = c(fx;zg;z) = fxg,
and for any other (T;s) 2 C(X) let c(T;s) = T.




That is, the decision-maker may continue cyclically to choose alternative y when the
reference point is y, or repeatedly switch back and forth between x and y, or stick
with x. Clearly, no cyclical chain starting from (X;z) goes through z. Therefore, the
limit set of (X;z) is fx;yg. Hence, the limit set L of a choice problem (T;s) can be
regarded as the set of possible nal choices.
In Example 4.4, for any y 2 X there exists no limit set of (X;y). This is because
there exists no cyclical chain. The decision-maker in Example 4.4 locally maximizes
the consumption of a good, increasing its consumption level choice by choice. In
Example 4.2 the limit set of (X;x) and (X;y) is fx;yg, and in Example 4.3 the limit
sets of (X;x) and (X;y) are fxg and fyg, respectively.
Note that NSC implies that any set of alternatives V that belongs to a limit set
L and that constitutes a cyclical chain must be non-strict, or put dierently, every
change of mind about the preferred alternative involves an indierence comparison.
This, however, is not equivalent to the fact that all alternatives in V are indierent
from any reference point in V .
The next axiom formally states independence from the initial reference point on
choice correspondences.
Limit Set Uniqueness (LSU): For any T 2 X and for any x;y 2 T, if L(T;x)
and L(T;y) exist, then L(T;x) = L(T;y).
On the reference-dependent preferences side, we introduce the following condition,
which constitutes a direct restriction on the dierence between the orders of distinct12
reference points.
Inverse Status Quo Positivity (ISQP): For any x;y 2 X, x x y implies
x y y.
ISQP goes in the opposite direction to the axioms typically imposed in the study
of phenomena related to the status quo bias (see section 5.1). It states that if x is
regarded as unambiguously superior to y when x is the reference point, this relation
should be maintained when the reference point is y, instead. We can now present our
next result.
Theorem 4.12. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties , , NSC and LSU.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises WEA and ISQP.
To illustrate Theorem 4.4 consider example 4.3. It is easy to see that it satises
properties ,  and NSC, but is not independent of the initial reference point. Exam-
ple 4.11 describes rationalizable and non-dominated behavior and is at the same time
independent of the initial reference point. Further, since x, z, and  are mutu-
ally dierent, example 4.11 shows that while independence from the initial reference
point, together with rationalizable and non-dominated behavior, imposes a great deal
of structure on reference-dependent behavior, there is still room for some degree of
reference point inuence.
4.4. Path-Independence. So far we have studied the independence of nal choices
from initial reference points given a set T 2 X, but what happens when the choice
set can also vary? That is, it is conceivable that a subject with rationalizable and
non-dominated behavior also satises independence of initial reference points, but her
nal choices may still depend on the particular sequence of presentation of the choice
problems.
The following condition is inspired from Plott's (1973) well-known independence
condition.
Plott's Path Independence (PPI): For any sets T;V 2 X, for every s 2 T \V
and z 2 L(T;s) [ L(V;s), L(T [ V;z) = L(L(T;s) [ L(V;s);z).
PPI states that the limit set of a choice set T [V , given a particular starting refer-
ence point z, depends neither on the starting point z, nor on a particular decomposi-
tion of the choice set. When LSU holds, PPI reduces to L(T [V ) = L(L(T)[L(V )).
The following example shows, however, that LSU is not a necessary condition for PPI.13
Example 4.13. Let X = fx;y;zg, c(X;x) = c(fx;yg;x) = c(fx;yg;y) = c(fx;zg;x) =
c(fx;zg;z) = fxg;c(X;y) = fx;zg, c(X;z) = c(fy;zg;z) = fyg, c(fy;zg;y) = fzg,
and for any other (T;s) 2 C(X) let c(T;s) = T.
Clearly, L(X;x) 6= L(X;y). Now, it is not dicult to check that PPI holds.
We will now see that LSU is, in combination with NSC, a sucient condition for
PPI. Further, Weak-NSC, together with PPI, imply NSC:
Theorem 4.14. For any choice correspondence c on C(X) that satises properties 
and :
 If c satises NSC and LSU, then c satises PPI.
 If c satises Weak-NSC and PPI, then c satises NSC.
Hence, an immediate corollary to Theorems and is:
Corollary 4.15. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties , , Weak-NSC, LSU, and PPI.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises WEA and ISQP.
Behavior in example 4.11 is rationalizable, non-dominated, and satises indepen-
dence of initial reference points. Then, Theorem 4.4 guarantees that PPI holds here
also. Hence, independence from initial reference points, on top of behavior that is
rationalizable and non-dominated, is quite a strong condition to impose on reference-
dependent behavior. It not only requires that, in a given choice set T, reference points
do not inuence nal choices, but also implies that the way in which the choice set is
presented is non-essential.
Note that since we are not imposing any extra property for path-independence, our
conclusion for example 4.11 remains valid. That is, behavior that is rationalizable,
non-dominated, independent of the initial reference point, and path-independent does
not necessarily collapse into a unique ordering; reference points still matter. We
should note here, however, that, with all this structure, and in particular given the
result in Theorem 4.4, reference points may still be behaviorally relevant only for the
initial choices in an RD-chain.
5. Applications
5.1. Status quo bias. There is a large and still-growing experimental and eld liter-
ature supporting the view that a decision-maker typically values an alternative more
highly when it is regarded as the status quo, than otherwise. Versions of this are14
called status quo bias, or endowment eect.10 An illuminating experiment that nicely
illustrates this bias is the following one, due to Knetsch (1989). A number of par-
ticipants were randomly split into three groups; call them group C, group M, and
group N. Those in group C were given a candy bar, those in group M received a
mug, and those in group N got nothing. Then, participants in groups C and M were
given the opportunity to change at zero cost their original object for the other. They
simply had to express the desire to change the object, and the experimenter would
immediately satisfy it. Participants in group N were simply given the opportunity
to choose between a candy bar and a mug. The results are surprising. Preferences
of subjects in group N were more or less evenly divided, while the great majority in
groups C and M expressed no desire to change (90% of participants in both C and
M), showing a strong status quo bias.
The many dierent versions of the above experiment that have been run have
yielded similar results, which suggests a high level of robustness in this nding. The
implications of the status quo bias are far more than anecdotal. This bias implies a
signicant discrepancy in willingness to pay and willingness to accept, as exemplied
in the experiments of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) and Bateman, Munro,
Rhodes, Starmer, and Sugden (1997). It also implies a dierence in the evaluation of
opportunity costs, as opposed to costs of any other nature (see Thaler, 1980). Fur-
thermore, the status quo bias implies that property rights inuence the valuation of
an object, and hence question the so-called Coase Theorem (see Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, 1990).11
In this section we apply the theoretical framework presented earlier to model the
status quo bias. In particular, we will show that a choice correspondence that rep-
resents the status quo bias is rationalizable by a book of complete preorders that is
consistent with non-dominated behavior, but not necessarily independent of initial
reference points, or path-independent.
In a recent paper, Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) nicely characterize a choice corre-
spondence representing the status quo bias. Here, we will derive on the book of binary
relations the set of axioms that are equivalent to theirs. For the sake of the complete-
ness of the exposition, we introduce Masatlioglu and Ok's (2005) axioms below. For
their motivation, however, we refer to their paper.
10Thaler (1980) was the rst to report this phenomenon. Other important experimental and
eld studies on the subject include Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988),
Knetsch (1989), Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990,
1991), and Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, and Sugden (1997). For reviews see Camerer (1995),
and Rabin (1998).
11One wonders whether \presumption of innocence", which is common practice in the legal sys-
tems of many countries, is an implicit recognition of the role of the status quo bias in judgment.
According to the status quo bias, the practice of the \presumption of innocence" would reduce the
risk of convicting an innocent person, which is typically regarded as a worse scenario than acquitting
someone who is guilty.15
Dominance (D): For any (T;s) 2 C(X), if fyg = c(T;s) for some T  V , and
y 2 c(V;), then y 2 c(V;s).
Status-quo Irrelevance (SQI): For any (T;s) 2 Crd(X), if y 2 c(T;s) and there
is no non-empty V  T with V 6= fsg and s 2 c(V;s), then y 2 c(T;).
Status-quo Bias (SQB): For any (T;s) 2 C(X), if y 2 c(T;s), then fyg = c(T;y).
We now introduce the set of axioms needed to reproduce Masatlioglu and Ok's
(2005) results on the book of binary relations. We start with an independence axiom.
Upper Independence (UI): For any x;y 2 Xnfsg, such that x s s and y s s,
x  y if and only if x s y.
This axiom restricts the inuence of the reference point when evaluating pairs of
alternatives. If x is evaluated to be at least as good as y when there is no reference
point, then for a reference point s such that x and y are strictly preferred to s, x
cannot deteriorate relative to y. Note, however, that the restrictions imposed by UI
are limited. UI restricts the ordering of pairs of alternatives x and y when the qualier
\x s s and y s s" holds.
Now consider the following two axioms.
Status-quo Positivity (SQP): For any s 2 X and y 2 Xnfsg, if s  y then
s s y.
Status-quo Positivity 2 (SQP2): For any distinct x;y;s 2 X, if x s s s y,
then x x y.
These properties are easily justied by the empirical regularity that we attempt to
model here. Property SQP establishes that if, in the absence of a reference point,
alternative s is valued to be as at least as good as y, when s happens to be the ref-
erence point its valuation with respect to y cannot only not deteriorate, it can only
improve. Property SQP2 extends the inuence of the status quo bias to some cases
when there is a reference point. That is, if x is preferred to y from the perspective
of the reference point s only when the reference point s is in between x and y, SQP2
states that the evaluation of x cannot deteriorate with respect to y when x is itself
the reference point. We now introduce the nal axiom we need.
Status-quo Singularity (SQS): For any s;y 2 X, if s s y, then s = y.
Property SQS strengthens the role of the status quo bias. It is a kind of antisymme-
try that applies only to comparisons with the reference point. It imposes either that
y is strictly preferred to the reference point s, or vice versa. SQS guarantees that,
whenever the reference point is chosen, it is uniquely chosen. We can now present16
the following result.
Theorem 5.1. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties  and , and axioms D, SQI, and SQB.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises UI, SQP, SQP2, and SQS.
Theorem 5.1, together with Masatlioglu and Ok's (2005) Lemma 1 and Theorem 1
immediately imply the following corollary.12
Corollary 5.2. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the rst statement implies
the second:
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises UI, SQP, SQP2, and SQS.
 There exist , where  is a partial order and  is a completion of ,
such that c(;) = M(;), and for all (T;s) 2 Crd(X)
c(T;s) =

fsg if s 2 M(T;)
M(T \ U(s);) otherwise
Furthermore, if X is a non-empty nite set then the above two statements are equiv-
alent.
For a detailed interpretation of the type of choice correspondence obtained in Corol-
lary 5.3 we refer to Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Here it is sucient to note that when
there is no reference point, the decision-maker selects an element from the set of
maximal elements based on a complete preorder relation . Clearly, this is no more
than the standard case and hence =.
When there is a reference point s, the decision-maker will only choose s if it belongs
to the set of maximal elements of a partial order , indicating a status quo bias.
Inspecting the proof of Masatlioglu and Ok's (2005) Lemma 1 we can establish that
the partial order  is such that x  y if and only if x y y. Theorem 5.1 clearly
shows that any \status quo bias-choice correspondence" is rationalizable by a book
of preorder relations. Interestingly, then, the pair of binary relations f;g in
Masatlioglu and Ok's result can be directly related to the book of reference-dependent
preferences we are working with.
It is easy to show that behavior subject to the status quo bias is non-dominated.
By way of contradiction and using NSC, let (T;si)n
i=0 be a cyclical and strict RD-
chain. Since it is cyclical it must be that s0 2 c(T;sn), but then SQB implies that
fs0g = c(T;s0), which, since (T;si)n
i=0 is strict, constitutes a contradiction.
A choice correspondence representing the status quo bias need not be independent
of the initial reference point. The following example represents the case of a \strong"
12For any T 2 X, M(T;) = fs 2 T : y  s for no y 2 Tg, and for any s 2 X, U(s) = fy 2 X :
y  sg.17
status quo bias that does not satisfy independence of the initial reference point. It can
be argued that the example is an abstract representation of Knetsch's experiment.
Let X = fx;yg, where x x y, y y x, and x  y. When there is no reference point,
both alternatives are evaluated by the decision-maker as indierent, but as soon as
the decision-maker has a reference point, she unambiguously prefers the reference
point to the other alternative. However, independence of the initial reference point
is clearly violated; the nal choice depends on which reference point is taken rst.
Hence, a decision-maker that manifests the status quo bias nevertheless exhibits
choice behavior that can be rationalized through a book of complete preorder rela-
tions, and is non-dominated. This suggests that there is still a great deal of rationality
in those who are subject to this bias.13 However, such a decision-maker could easily
be manipulated in situations where an external agent may exercise some inuence
over the prevalence of a specic reference point, or over the way the choice problem
is presented. In this sense, the nal choice depends on the discretion of the agent.14
It is interesting to explore the structure of status quo choice correspondences when
independence from the initial reference point is imposed. To this end, we study
the consequences of adding ISQP to the set of properties on reference-dependent
preferences we imposed above. Consider SQP again, and note that it implies that,
when x y y, then :(y  x). By completeness it must be that x  y, and, again
by applying SQP, we obtain that x x y. Hence, SQP together with completeness
implies that if x y y, then x x y. Remarkably, ISQP involves precisely the reverse
implication, namely if x x y, then x y y. Therefore, if we impose both, ISQP
and SQP, we get that for any x;y 2 X, x y y , x x y. Clearly, this imposes a
great deal of structure into the book of preference relations. In fact, it is easy to see
that when ISQP is added, then  is complete and then it must be that ==.
Consider, by way of contradiction, that there are x;y 2 X such that :(x  y) and
:(y  x). Since x  y if, and only if, x y y, completeness of s implies that x x y
and y y x, which is a contradiction. Thus, the above discussion leads immediately
to the next corollary.
Corollary 5.3. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the rst statement implies
the second:
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises UI, SQP, SQP2, SQS, and ISQP.
 For all (T;s) 2 C(X), c(;s) = M(;).
Furthermore, if X is a non-empty nite set then the above two statements are equiv-
alent.
13Interestingly, Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler (2005) theoretically show that decision-makers
that exhibit a status quo bias are favored by evolution.
14Camerer, Issaharo, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) argue that the status quo
bias constitutes a perfect example for the possibility of what they call \paternalistic regulation".
That is, regulation that could greatly benet those who are subject to this bias, while causing little
harm to those who are not.18
That is, if status quo choice behavior is independent of the initial reference point,
then this implies that only one preference relation is required to rationalize behavior,
.
5.2. Addiction. Our second application concerns addictive behavior and habit for-
mation models. Since Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1970), and Ryder and Heal (1973)
the literature concerning models of habit formation and addiction has attracted the
attention of economists. The former is used in variants of growth models to explore
life-cycle consumption plans, and is being applied to a wide variety of cases (see, e.g.,
Campbell 1999). With regard to the latter, the work of Becker and Murphy (1988)
has generated an enlightening discussion on how to approach the modelling of addic-
tive behavior (see, e.g., Herrnstein and Prelec 1992, and Elster 1999). The modelling
approaches to both types of phenomena are very similar. It is typically assumed that
an increase in past consumption increases present and future consumption, and hence
the focus is mainly on increasing consumption patterns.
To be more specic, we will interpret the behavior arising from the axioms below
on the grounds of addiction, and leave aside the habit formation interpretation. The
following describes our notion of addictive behavior.
(1) Dependence on past consumptions: the current reference point is the last level
of consumption;
(2) Tolerance: given the actual reference point, the individual either maintains
the current level of consumption or increases it;
(3) Saturation: there may be (but not necessarily) a level of consumption over
which increments in consumption are not positively evaluated;
(4) Craving: the higher the reference point, the higher the saturation level, if such
a level exists; and
(5) Convexity: for any reference point, every alternative between two selected
alternatives is also selected.
In line with the approach taken in this paper, (1) assumes a particular type of
dependence: the last consumption level determines the current level of addiction. (2)
captures the fact that addicts get used to the substance, thus requiring increasingly
higher doses. (3) suggests limits to the development of tolerance. (4) captures the fact
that the higher the current level of addiction the higher the limit to which the addict
is willing to consume. Finally, (5) establishes a sort of continuity in the consumption
levels.
We now turn to the characterization we propose. We begin by introducing a linearly
ordered universal set of alternatives (X;). That is,  is a transitive, complete and
antisymmetric binary relation over the non-empty alternative space X, and < is the
asymmetric part of . By way of illustration, consider that X = [0;k] represents the
feasible set of grams of some addictive substance, where a natural linear order arises.
The following three properties on choice behavior formally dene addictive behav-
ior.19
Monotonicity (M): For any (T;s) 2 C(X), if y 2 c(T;s) then s  y.
This axiom simply states that addictive behavior leads to consumption levels above
the reference point, where `above' is interpreted according to . In a recent paper
Bossert and Sprumont (2006) formulated a similar property, called Non-deteriorating
Choice. Their interpretation is that  is a preference relation, and hence, the agent
responds by choosing a better alternative than the reference point. Here, however,
since we are describing addiction patterns, we maintain a more general interpretation
of .
Saturation Monotonicity (SM): For any pair (T;s);(T;r) 2 C(X), if s  r
then, for all p 2 c(T;r) there exists q 2 c(T;s) such that q  p.
SM imposes a weak property on the monotonicity of the sets of possible consump-
tion levels selected. It states that if p is chosen from r, then from the perspective of
any reference point below r, say s, the set of possible choices should start before p.
In other words, the saturation level of s (a consumption level above which increments
according to  are not evaluated as strictly positive) is lower than that of r.
Convexity (C): For all (T;s) 2 Crd(X), if V  T;v 2 c(V;s);t 2 c(T;s), if there
is p 2 V such that v  p  t or t  p  v then p 2 c(V;s).
Whenever T = V , C simply means that any alternative in between two selected
ones should also be selected. If T 6= V and t 2 V , then if properties  and  apply,
it must also be that t 2 c(V;s). However, it could be the case that t 62 V . In such an
event, C imposes that any available level in between v and t should be selected when
V is the choice set.
We now introduce a set of axioms over a book of binary relations that characterize
addictive behavior.
Left Status-quo Positivity (LSQP): For any s 2 X and y 2 Xnfsg, if y < s
then s s y.
Notice the analogy between LSQP and axiom SQP, used in the previous application.
If the linear order  describes the same ranking as , both axioms are equivalent.
This would be the case if, say, a \clean" person who has not yet consumed any of
the addictive substance (e.g. cigarettes) were to consider that \more cigarettes are
better than less". However, it is perfectly possible for preferences without a reference
point  to be very dierent. In such cases, both axioms diverge. LSQP establishes
that the evaluation of the reference point cannot deteriorate for those initiating in
addictive behavior.20
Status-quo Monotonicity (SQM): For any x  y  u  v elements of X, such
that v x u x x it must be that v y u.
Suppose that the greater element v is clearly preferred to u whenever the reference
point is x, and both are signicant with respect to x. If we move the reference point
nearer to the pair u;v, this comparison must necessarily remain the same.
Absence of Jumps (AJ): If y x x, x  h  y then h x x.
If an alternative is preferred to the reference point, intermediate levels should also
be preferred to the reference point.
Weak single peakedness (WSP): If y x z x x;y  z  h implies z x h.
WSP establishes that, once an agent has chosen to ignore improvements over ,
this pattern is maintained. Notice that standard single peaked preferences satisfy
stronger versions of this property. First of all, with single peaked preferences the
above restriction is imposed over the entire set X, while we only impose it for ele-
ments above the reference point. Secondly, single peakedness would require a strict
preference whenever z < h, which is not our case.
Theorem 5.4. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
 c satises properties  and , and axioms M, SM and C.
 There exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that rationalizes
c, and that satises LSQP, SQM, AJ and WSP.
Addictive behavior is obviously a type of non-dominated behavior. By M, any
RD-chain (T;si)n
i=0 must satisfy si  si+1;i = 0;1;:::;n   1. In order to be strict, it
must be that sk < sk+1 for some k, and therefore, it cannot be cyclical. On the other
hand, the following example shows that it is neither necessarily independent of initial
reference points, nor, therefore, path-independent.
Example 5.5. Let X = fx;y;zg, x  y  z, y x x x z, z y y y x, and
z z y z x.
If we let T = fx;zg, then it is clear that LSU does not hold. But the above example
says more. It describes a gradual pattern of addiction, and shows that if the choice
set could be manipulated, the addiction level of the individual could be kept to a
minimum. That is, if the agent starts with a reference point x (e.g., x = 0 grams of
cocaine) and the choice set is X, then he will end up consuming the maximum feasible
quantity z, whereas if he is confronted with choice set T, from the perspective of x21
he may nd z too much and will then keep \clean". This is an illustration of why
educational initiatives emphasizing \all or nothing" consumption patterns may be
successful in preventing addiction (for a discussion see Herrnstein and Prelec 1992).
6. Conclusion
This paper is a reaction to the accumulated empirical evidence suggesting that
behavior is reference-dependent in a variety of environments. It has been our aim to
provide an axiomatic characterization of such behavior, general enough to be appli-
cable to the modelling of a wide range of specic phenomena. We believe that the
incorporation into economic theory of such well-established and predictable phenom-
ena is a natural step that will eventually help towards the better understanding of
economic behavior.
We have studied choice behavior and preference relations, and have gradually im-
posed rationality demands on them. We have shown that reference-dependent behav-
ior may satisfy a large number of rationality demands, while still being dependent on
reference points.
We have axiomatized reference-dependent behavior when the reference point, if
it exists, belongs to the choice set. We chose this as the best approach to certain
problems, such as those we have modelled here: status quo bias and addiction. In
some situations, of course, it may be more appropriate not to impose that the reference
point be part of the choice set. Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) constitute an example
of the latter. They characterize choice functions that select the closest point to
the reference point in the choice set (they axiomatize a \minimal distance" choice
function). This suggests what we believe to be a promising line for future research,
namely, the characterization of reference-dependent behavior for phenomena where
the reference point may not belong to the choice set.15
We further suggest that the application of our work may prove fruitful for the
modelling of other reference-dependent phenomena, thus opening up another line for
future research.
7. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let us rst show that when c satises axiom WARP, then
c satises properties  and . Consider a choice correspondence satisfying WARP.
Suppose, by way of contradiction that  is not satised. In this case, there exists a
pair of sets V  T and a pair of elements x 2 V , s 2 V or s =  such that x 2 c(T;s)
but x 62 c(V;s). Since c is non-empty valued by denition, there exists y 2 c(V;s),
y 2 V  T, thus contradicting WARP. Property  is trivial, and therefore, this part
of the proof is omitted.
We now show that if c(T;s) satises properties  and , then there exists a book of
transitive relations fsgs2X such that c(T;s) =  (T;s) and every s is complete
15Note however that, as Rubinstein and Zhou state, considering choice problems where the ref-
erence point does not necessarily belong to the choice set does not increase the generality of the
theory, since the required axioms will be more demanding.22
in Xs. Let c satisfy properties  and , and dene for all s in X the binary relation
s on X by x s y if and only if x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s). In order to condense the proofs, in
the previous denition and throughout the paper, we interpret that whenever s = ,
fx;y;g = fx;yg.
We start by checking for transitivity. First note that, whenever s = , we can
apply standard results that guarantee the transitivity of . Then, we have to show
that for all x;y;z;s 2 X, if x s y s z, then x s z. Let x s y s z. If
z 2 c(fx;y;z;sg;s), applying property  implies that z 2 c(fy;z;sg;s), then by
property , y 2 c(fx;y;z;sg;s). Now suppose that t 2 fy;sg is in c(fx;y;z;sg;s), by
property , t 2 c(fx;t;sg;s). Since, in any case, x 2 c(fx;t;sg;s), then by property
, x 2 c(fx;y;z;sg;s). Therefore, it must always be that x 2 c(fx;y;z;sg;s) and by
applying property  we get x 2 c(fx;z;sg;s). This implies x s z and transitivity,
as desired.
We now show that if y 2 c(T;s) then y 2 G(T;s). By property , y 2 c(T;s)
implies y 2 c(fy;h;sg;s) for all h 2 T, which means y s h for all h 2 T. Hence
it must be that y 2 G(T;s). Therefore, c(T;s)  G(T;s), and consequently
G(T;s) 6= ;. Now let y 2 G(T;s), which implies that y s h for all h 2 T. Take
any z 2 c(T;s). By property , z 2 c(fs;y;zg;s). Since y s z, it must also be that
y 2 c(fs;y;zg;s), and hence property  guarantees that y 2 c(T;s). This concludes
the second part of the proof.
We now prove that this book also M-rationalizes c. Suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, that there exists a set T and an element s 2 X such that G(T;s) 6= M(T;s).
Therefore, there must exist an element x 2 M(T;s) n G(T;s), which is equivalent to
saying that there exists an element x such that :(y s x) for all y 2 T and :(x s z)
for at least one z 2 T. Hence, given the denition of s the only possibility is that
s = c(fx;z;sg;s). By G-rationalizability, this guarantees that s s x, thus con-
tradicting the fact that x 2 M(T;s). Therefore the book must also M-rationalize
c.
We are left to prove that every s is complete in Xs. Consider x;y 2 Xs. We
have to prove that either x or y is selected in fx;y;sg. Suppose otherwise. Then, by
property , s 2 c(fx;y;sg;s) implies that s 2 c(fx;sg;s). By property , it must
also be that x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s), which is an absurd. Therefore, s is complete in Xs.
We nally show that if there is a book fsgs2X of transitive relations, such that
every s is complete in Xs, and that  -rationalizes c, then c satises WARP. Standard
results apply to the case of s = . Hence, now we study the case where s 6= .
Assume by reduction to the absurd that WARP does not hold, i.e., there exists
y 2 c(T;s), s;x;y 2 T \ V , x 2 c(V;s) and y = 2 c(V;s). Given that y 2 c(T;s),
 -rationalization guarantees that y 2 c(fy;sg;s) and therefore y 2 Xs. Similarly,
given that x 2 c(V;s), we can derive that x 2 Xs. Since y 2 c(T;s) =  (T;s), the
completeness assumption guarantees that y s t for every t 2 Xs \ T. Particularly,
y s x. Since x 2 c(V;s) =  (V;s), x s v for every v 2 Xs \ V . By transitivity
of s, it must also be that y s v for every v 2 Xs \ V . Given the completeness
assumption on Xs, y s s. Now, note that  -rationalization guarantees that, for
every x 62 Xs, s s x. Therefore, transitivity guarantees that y s v for every23
v 2 (XnXs)\V . This shows that y s v for all v 2 V , which contradicts the original
assumption that c is  -rationalizated. This concludes the argument. Items 1;2 and
3 are equivalent.
The last part of the lemma is straightforward and thus has been omitted. 
Proof of Corollary 4.6. The book of preorders fsgs2X used in the proof of
the previous lemma can be easily completed. We have proved that s is complete
in Xs and that x s y for all x 2 Xs and y 2 X n Xs. Clearly, :(x s y) for all
x;y 2 X n Xs. Consider then the book of preorders f0
sgs2X given by x 0
s y if and
only if :(y s x). That is, whenever x s y we still write x 0
s y and establish an
equivalence relation in X nXs. This satises the requirements. The rest of the proof
follows from Lemma 4.5. 
The following lemma will be useful for our next characterization result.
Lemma 7.1. Let c be dened on C(X) and satisfy properties , , and NSC. Let
fsgs2X be a book of complete preorders that rationalizes c. Take sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2
sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0 with at least one strict inequality. Then, for all p 2 f1;2;:::;ng,
for all t 2 f1;2;:::;pg, we must have sp 2 c(fsp;sp 1;:::;sp tg;sp 1).
Proof of Lemma 7.1. If t = 1, then, for any p 2 f1;2;:::;ng, using sp sp 1 sp 1,
we conclude that sp 2 c(fsp;sp 1g;sp 1). We will now prove the following induction
hypothesis: If the result is valid for any t = 1;2;:::;k with k < p (otherwise the
induction is complete for this value of p), it is also valid for t = k + 1. By con-
tradiction, let sp 62 c(fsp;sp 1;:::;sp k 1g;sp 1): In this case, consider the set T =
fsp;sp 1;sp 2;:::;sp k 1g. If for some j 2 f1;2;:::;kg, we have sp j 2 c(T;sp 1)
then by property , we have sp j 2 c(T nfsp k 1g;sp 1) and using the induction hy-
pothesis and property , we obtain sp 2 c(T;sp 1), which is absurd. Then, we must
have fsp k 1g = c(T;sp 1), and by properties  and  fsp k 1g = c(Tnfspg;sp 1). By
hypothesis it must also be that sp 1 2 c(T nfspg;sp 2). Since sp k sp k 1 sp k 1, we
can nd an element sl1 such that sl1 2 c(Tnfspg;sp k 1) and l1 > p k 1. If l1 6= p 1
proceed in an analogous way, considering an element sl2 such that sl2 2 c(T nfspg;sl1)
and l2 > l1 (note that such an l2 exists because the induction hypothesis is valid for
the set T n fspg, smaller than T). Since set T is nite, we will nd an element
lm = p   1 such that slm 2 c(T n fspg;slm 1). The sequence of reference-dependent
choice problems (T nfspg;sp 1);(T nfspg;sp k 1);(T nfspg;sl1);:::;(T nfspg;slm 1)
constitutes a strict RD-chain. However, sp 1 = slm 2 c(T n fspg;slm 1), contradict-
ing NSC. Therefore, the induction is valid for t = k+1. Thus, the lemma is proved. 
Proof of Theorem 4.8. We rst show that, given a choice correspondence c sat-
isfying properties ,  and NSC, we can nd a book of preferences satisfying the
requirements. Consider the binary relations s dened in the proof of Corollary 4.6.
They turn out to be not only transitive but complete, and therefore, to conclude this
part of the proof we only need to observe that they satisfy WEA. First, consider the24
following property:
Crossed Transitivity (CT): For any collection s0;s1;:::;sn 2 X such that
sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0 with at least one strict inequality, we must
have sn sn s0.
It is not dicult to show that CT and WEA are equivalent in our context of
complete preorders. Consider a book fsgs2X of complete preorders. To show
that WEA implies CT let, by way of contradiction, s0;s1;:::;sn 2 X such that
sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0, with one strict link, say sj with 0  j  n 1,
and sn sn s0. Then we can write that
sj sj 1 sj 1 sj 2 sj 2 s0 sn sn sn 1 sn 1 sj+2 sj+1 sj+1
then WEA implies that sj sj sj+1, but this contradicts our original assumption. In
an analogous way it can be proved that CT implies WEA.
We proceed to prove that the book dened in the proof of Corollary 4.6 satises CT.
Let sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0 s0 with at least one strict inequality. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that s0 sn sn. Consider the set V = fs0;s1;:::;sng. Select
a group of elements by means of the following inductive argument:
(1) By hypothesis, there exists an integer k 2 f0;1;:::;ng such that sk 2 c(V;sn).
Select the smallest integer in this group and denote it by p1.
(2) If pj = n, stop the inductive process. Otherwise, to obtain pj+1, consider the
problem (V;spj). Lemma 7.1 guarantees that spj+1 exists in c(fs0;:::;spj+1g;spj).
Therefore, there exists an integer k 2 fpj + 1;:::;ng such that sk 2 c(V;spj). Let
pj+1 denote the smallest integer satisfying this property.
Inductive reasoning gives us a collection of natural numbers p1, p2, ..., pm where
m  2. The sequence of problems (V;sn);(V;sp1);:::; (V;spm 1) constitutes an RD-
chain, the strictness of which we will now establish. To see this, consider the strict
comparison sr+1 sr sr with r 2 f0;1;:::;n   1g. We need to study two cases:
 pq  r < pq+1. We will show that pq 62 c(V;pq). To this end we need to analyze
two cases. First, if pq+1   pq = 1, the preference between these two elements is
strict, and then pq 62 c(V;pq). Second, if the dierence is greater, then suppose, by
way of contradiction, that pq 2 c(V;pq). In this case, pq + 1 is also in c(V;pq), thus
contradicting the denition of pq+1.
 p1 > r. In this case, it is easy to see that sn 62 c(V;sn). Otherwise, 0 = p1, which
using s0 sn sn contradicts p1 > r.
We have proved that the RD-chain is strict. Therefore, by NSC, it must be that
sn 62 c(V;spm 1), thus contradicting spm = sn 2 c(V;spm 1). Hence s0 sn sn cannot
hold and, sn being complete, we obtain sn sn s0. This proves that the book of
preferences satises CT and therefore, WEA.
We now prove that if there is a book of reference-dependent complete preorders
satisfying WEA, the corresponding choice mapping satises properties ,  and NSC.
Taking into account Lemma 4.5, we only need to prove NSC. Consider a strict chain
(T;si)n
i=0. Since the chain is strict, there must exist 0  k < n and y 2 T such25
that y sk sk. Since si 2 c(T;si 1), and given completeness, we must have that
si si 1 h, i = 1;2;:::;n, for all h 2 T. In particular, we have that sk+1 sk y
and by transitivity, we obtain that sk+1 sk sk. We therefore obtain a sequence of
comparisons
sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::sk+1 sk sk :::s1 s0 s0
and by applying CT we must have that sn sn s0, which shows that s0 is not in
M(T;sn) = c(T;sn), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We begin by showing that if c satises properties , ,
NSC and LSU, then there exists a book fsgs2X of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satises WEA and ISQP. Take the book of complete preorders
dened in the proof of Lemma 4.5. By considering Theorem 4:8, we only need to check
ISQP. Consider, by way of contradiction, two elements x;y 2 X such that x x y
but y y x. Since the book rationalizes c, we must have fxg = c(fx;yg;x) and
y 2 c(fx;yg;y). Thus, the limit set of (fx;yg;x) is fxg, while the limit of (fx;yg;y)
must contain y, thus contradicting LSU.
We now prove the converse statement. Consider Theorem 4:8, then we only need
to check LSU. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a subset T and
elements x;y 2 T such that
 L is the limit set of (T;x), and
 L0 is the limit set of (T;y),
with L 6= L0.
Without loss of generality, suppose that z 2 L and z 62 L0, and take w 2 L0. By
NSC, for all s 2 L[L0 we must have that s 2 c(T;s) (otherwise, the cyclical subchain
containing s would be strict, which is absurd). Then, z 2 c(T;z) and w 2 c(T;w),
which implies that z z w and w w z. By ISQP we must have z z w and w w z.
Thus, z 2 c(T;w) and w 2 c(T;z). There exists a cyclical RD-chain (T;si)k
i=0 such
that s0 = y and sk = w. Then, the chain (T;si)
k+1
i=0, with sk+1 = z implies that z 2 L0,
which is absurd. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. To see that NSC is implied by PPI and Weak-NSC con-
sider, by way of contradiction, a cyclical and strict RD-chain where the reference set
T contains at least 3 elements. Since the chain is strict, there exists a pair of elements
x;y such that x 62 c(T;x), y 2 c(T;x). Clearly, x;y 2 L(T;y). Properties  and 
guarantee that fyg = c(fx;yg;x) and therefore, using Weak-NSC, it is clear that
L(fx;yg) = fyg. Then, L(T;y) 6= L(L(fx;yg;y) [ L(T n fxg;y);y). Therefore, PPI
does not hold, which is a contradiction. Finally Weak-NSC concludes the proof.
We now show that LSU and NSC are sucient to imply PPI. Given LSU, to show
that PPI is implied, we only have to show that L(T [V ) = L(L(T)[L(V )), for every
T;V 2 C(X). Let T and V be any two sets in C(X). First, let z 2 L(T [ V ) and,
without loss of generality, let z 2 T. Then, by NSC, it must be that z 2 c(T [ V;z).
Further, by property  we have that z 2 c(T;z), and hence by LSU, z 2 L(T).26
Hence, we can apply property  again to get z 2 c(L(T) [ L(V );z), and by LSU,
z 2 L(L(T) [ L(V )). Then we have that L(T [ V )  L(L(T) [ L(V )).
Now let z 2 L(L(T) [ L(V )). The case where z 2 T and z 2 V is trivial. So
consider, without loss of generality, that z 2 T and z = 2 V . By NSC, z z h for all
h 2 T [ L(V ). Let there exist a t 2 V nL(V ) such that t z z. By LSU there are
s0;s1;:::;sn 2 V and x 2 L(V ) such that x sn sn sn 1 sn 1 sn 2 sn 2 :::s1 s0
s0 t t z z. Then, by Theorem 4.4 WEA holds, which implies that x x z, and by
ISQP we have that x z z, a contradiction. Hence, z z h for all h 2 T [ V , and
then L(L(T) [ L(V ))  L(T [ V ), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We rst show that if there is a book of complete preorders
fsgs2X that satises UI, SQP, SQP2, SQS, and c(T;s) = M(T;s), then c satises
properties  and , and axioms D, SQI, and SQB. The implication on properties 
and  is shown in Lemma 4.5.
 D: Let y 6= s 6= . Let fyg = c(T;s) = M(T;s), and y 2 c(V;) = M(V;),
T  V . Then y s h for all h 2 Tnfyg, and y  h for all h 2 V . For all t 2 V nfs;yg,
either t s s or s s t. When t s s, given that y s s, then by UI, y  t implies that
y s t. If s s t, by SQS s s t. Now, assume, by way of contradiction, that t s y.
Then, since y s s and s s t, M(fs;y;tg;s) = ;, which is a contradiction. Then
it must be that y s t, and therefore, y 2 M(V;s) = c(V;s). Now let y = s 6= .
Then y 2 c(V;) = M(V;) implies that y  h for all h 2 V . By SQP y y h for
all h 2 V nfyg, and hence y 2 M(V;y) = c(V;y). Finally, the case when s =  is
trivial, and therefore omitted.
 SQI: Let y 2 c(T;s) = M(T;s), and assume that there exists no non-empty
V  T with V 6= fsg and s 2 c(V;s). Then y s h for all h 2 T, and h s s for all
h 2 Tnfsg. By applying UI we get y  h for all h 2 Tnfsg. Finally, it must be that
y  s, since otherwise s  y implies, by SQP, that s s y, a contradiction. Hence,
y 2 M(T;) = c(T;).
 SQB: Let y 6= s 6=  and y 2 c(T;s) = M(T;s). Then, y s h for all h 2 T.
By SQS, y s s implies y s s. For all z 2 Tnfs;yg, either s s z or z s s. If
s s z, by SQS s s z. Then y s s s z, by SQP2, implies y y z. If z s s,
then y s z, by UI, implies y  z, and SQP implies y y z. Now, if s  y,
SQP would imply that s s y, a contradiction. Hence, it must be that y  s,
and then SQP implies that y y s. Hence fyg = M(T;y) = c(T;y). Now let
y 6= s = . Then if y 2 c(T;) = M(T;), y  h for all h 2 T, by SQP y y h
for all h 2 Tnfyg, and then fyg = M(T;y) = c(T;y). Finally, let y = s 6= . If
y 2 c(T;y) = M(T;y), y y h for all h 2 T, by SQS y y h for all h 2 Tnfyg, and
then fyg = M(T;y) = c(T;y).
To show the reverse implication, we will use the book of binary relations dened
in the proof of Lemma 4.5, where it was shown that if c satises properties  and ,
then fsgs2X is a book of complete preorders, and that c(T;s) = M(T;s).
 UI: Let x s s, y s s. We will show both implications for the case of x 6= y;
the case of x = y is trivial. Let x s y, then by denition, either x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s) or
fsg = c(fx;y;sg;s). If fsg = c(fx;y;sg;s), then properties  and  imply that fsg =27
c(fx;sg;s), which contradicts x s s. Then, it must be that x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s). Note
that s = 2 c(fx;sg;s), and s = 2 c(fy;sg;s). If s 2 c(fx;y;sg;s) then by property  we
get s 2 c(fx;sg;s), a contradiction. Hence we can apply SQI to get x 2 c(fx;y;sg;).
By property , x 2 c(fx;yg;), as desired. Let us now assume that x  y, and by
way of contradiction, :(x s y). Then x 2 c(fx;yg;), and fyg = c(fx;y;sg;s). By
SQI we get y 2 c(fx;y;sg;). By applying properties  and , x 2 c(fx;y;sg;).
Now, since fxg = c(fx;sg;s) and x 2 c(fx;y;sg;), by D, x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s), which
is a contradiction. Hence it must be that x s y.
 SQP: Let s  y, then it must be that s 2 c(fs;yg;). By applying SQB, we get
fsg = c(fs;yg;s), as desired.
 SQP2: Let x s s s y, by transitivity, x s y, which by denition implies that
x 2 c(fx;y;sg;s). By SQB fxg = c(fx;y;sg;x), and by applying properties  and
, we get fxg = c(fx;yg;x).
 SQS: Let s s y. Since choice correspondences are non-empty valued by def-
inition, the case of no comparability between s and y does not apply here. Then
s 2 c(fy;sg;s) and y 2 c(fy;sg;s). By SQB fsg = c(fy;sg;s), and hence y = s. 
Proof of Theorem 5.4. We rst show that if c satises the mentioned properties,
we can nd a book of preferences as described. Consider the book of complete pre-
orders that rationalizes c in the proof of Lemma 4.5. If x > y, by M, we cannot have
y 2 c(fx;yg;x) and therefore, x x y, which proves LSQP.
To show SQM, consider x  y  u  v with v x u x x. First of all, we will
prove that v x y. Otherwise, y x v x u x x and therefore, y 2 c(T;x) where
T = fx;y;u;vg. At the same time v 2 c(V;x) with V = fx;u;vg. Since y  u  v
and u 2 V , by applying C, we must have that u 2 c(V;x), which is absurd because
v x u. Thus, v x y. Given the hypothesis, we must have that fvg = c(T;x). The
application of SM leads to fvg = c(T;y) and therefore, v y u.
To show AJ, suppose that y x x x h with x  h  y. Consider the sets
T = fx;y;hg and V = fx;hg. By hypothesis, y 2 c(T;x) and fxg = c(V;x). The
application of C leads to h 2 c(V;x). However, this is absurd, since we cannot have
h = x.
To prove WSP, suppose y x z x x and y  z  h. By way of contradiction, let
us suppose that h x z. There are two possibilities:
 If y x h, then consider T = fx;y;z;hg and V = fx;z;hg. It is obvious that
y 2 c(T;x) while h 2 c(V;x). By C it must also be that z 2 c(V;x), which is absurd,
because h x z.
 If h x y, consider the sets T = fx;y;z;hg and V = fx;y;zg. Then we have
h 2 c(T;x) and y 2 c(V;x). The application of C again leads to z 2 c(V;x), which is
absurd because y x z.
This concludes the rst part of the proof.
Now suppose that there exists a book satisfying the requirements. Proving M is
straightforward. To prove SM, consider x  y and p 2 c(T;y). By M, we must have
that x  y  p. If p 2 c(T;x), the proof is complete. If not, consider any q 2 c(T;x)
such that p < q. In this case, q x p and q x x. AJ guarantees that p x x. Then,28
by applying SQM, we have that q y p and therefore, p 62 c(T;y), which is absurd.
Therefore, there are no such elements and any h 2 c(T;x) must full h < p, which
proves SM.
To end the proof, we only need to show that C is satised. Consider V  T,
v 2 c(V;x) and t 2 c(T;x). Let p 2 V , with v  p  t and suppose, by way of contra-
diction, that p 62 c(V;x). In this case, we must have that v x p and x  v  p  t,
otherwise, by LSQP x x v, which is a contradiction. Since t x x, AJ implies that
p x x. Therefore, v x p x x and v  p  t guarantees p x t by application of
WSP. Therefore p 2 c(T;x) and by property , p 2 c(V;x), which is absurd. The
case in which t  p  v is very similar and is, therefore, omitted. 
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